Mortgage market
Number
of U.S. residential properties subject to foreclosure actions by quarter
(2007-2009).
Subprime borrowers
typically have weakened credit histories and reduced repayment capacity.
Subprime loans have a higher risk of default than loans to prime borrowers.
If a borrower is delinquent
in making timely mortgage payments to the loan servicer (a bank or other
financial firm), the lender may take possession of the property, in a process
called foreclosure.
The value of USA subprime
mortgages was estimated at $1.3 trillion as of March 2007, with over 7.5
million first-lien subprime mortgages outstanding. Between 2004-2006 the share
of subprime mortgages relative to total originations ranged from 18%-21%,
versus less than 10% in 2001-2003 and during 2007. IN the third quarter of
2007, subprime ARMs making up only 6.8% of USA mortgages outstanding also
accounted for 43% of the foreclosures which began during that quarter. By October
2007, approximately 16% of subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) were either
90-days delinquent or the lender had begun foreclosure proceedings, roughly
triple the rate of 2005. By January 2008, the delinquency rate had risen to 21%
and by May 2008 it was 25%.
The value of all
outstanding residential mortgages, owed by USA households to purchase
residences housing at most four families, was US$9.9 trillion as of year-end
2006, and US$10.6 trillion as of midyear 2008. During 2007, lenders had begun foreclosure
proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006. This
increased to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007, and again to 2.8
million in 2009, a 21% increase vs. 2008.
By August 2008, 9.2% of all
U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure. By
September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%. Between August 2007 and October 2008,
936,439 USA residences completed foreclosure. Foreclosures are concentrated in
particular states both in terms of the number and rate of foreclosure filings.
Ten states accounted for 74% of the foreclosure filings during 2008; the top
two (California and Florida) represented 41%. Nine states were above the
national foreclosure rate average of 1.84% of households.
Causes
The
crisis can be attributed to a number of factors pervasive in both housing and
credit markets,
factors which emerged over a number of years. Causes proposed include the
inability of homeowners to make their mortgage payments, due primarily to
adjustable-rate mortgages resetting, borrowers overextending, predatory
lending, speculation and overbuilding during the boom period, risky mortgage
products, high personal and corporate debt levels, financial products that
distributed and perhaps concealed the risk of mortgage default, monetary
policy, international trade imbalances, and government regulation (or the lack
thereof). Three important catalysts of the subprime crisis were the influx of
moneys from the private sector, the banks entering into the mortgage bond
market and the predatory lending practices of mortgage brokers, specifically
the adjustable-rate mortgage, 2-28 loan. On Wall Street and in the financial
industry, moral hazard lay at the core of many of the causes.
In its "Declaration of
the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy," dated 15 November
2008, leaders of the Group of 20 cited the following causes:
During a period of strong global
growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stability earlier this decade,
market participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of
the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, weak
underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex
and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to
create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and
supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and
address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial
innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic
regulatory actions.
Boom and bust in the housing market
Vicious
Cycles in the Housing & Financial Markets
Low interest rates and
large inflows of foreign funds created easy credit conditions for a number of
years prior to the crisis, fueling a housing market boom and encouraging
debt-financed consumption. The USA home ownership rate increased from 64% in
1994 (about where it had been since 1980) to an all-time high of 69.2% in 2004.
Subprime lending was a major contributor to this increase in home ownership
rates and in the overall demand for housing, which drove prices higher.
Between 1997 and 2006, the
price of the typical American house increased by 124%. During the two decades
ending in 2001, the national median home price ranged from 2.9 to 3.1 times
median household income. This ratio rose to 4.0 in 2004, and 4.6 in 2006. This
housing bubble resulted in quite a few homeowners refinancing their homes at
lower interest rates, or financing consumer spending by taking out second
mortgages secured by the price appreciation. USA household debt as a percentage
of annual disposable personal income was 127% at the end of 2007, versus 77% in
1990.
While housing prices were
increasing, consumers were saving less and both borrowing and spending more.
Household debt grew from $705 billion at yearend 1974, 60% of disposable
personal income, to $7.4 trillion at yearend 2000, and finally to $14.5
trillion in midyear 2008, 134% of disposable personal income. During 2008, the
typical USA household owned 13 credit cards, with 40% of households carrying a
balance, up from 6% in 1970. Free cash used by consumers from home equity
extraction doubled from $627 billion in 2001 to $1,428 billion in 2005 as the
housing bubble built, a total of nearly $5 trillion dollars over the period.
U.S. home mortgage debt relative to GDP increased from an average of 46% during
the 1990s to 73% during 2008, reaching $10.5 trillion.
This credit and house price
explosion led to a building boom and eventually to a surplus of unsold homes,
which caused U.S. housing prices to peak and begin declining in mid-2006. Easy
credit, and a belief that house prices would continue to appreciate, had
encouraged many subprime borrowers to obtain adjustable-rate mortgages.
These mortgages enticed borrowers with a below market interest rate for some
predetermined period, followed by market interest rates for the remainder of
the mortgage's term. Borrowers who could not make the higher payments once the
initial grace period ended would try to refinance their mortgages. Refinancing
became more difficult, once house prices began to decline in many parts of the
USA. Borrowers who found themselves unable to escape higher monthly payments by
refinancing began to default.
As more borrowers stop
paying their mortgage payments (this is an on-going crisis), foreclosures and
the supply of homes for sale increases. This places downward pressure on
housing prices, which further lowers homeowners' equity. The decline in
mortgage payments also reduces the value of mortgage-backed securities, which
erodes the net worth and financial health of banks. This vicious cycle is at
the heart of the crisis.
By September 2008, average
U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak. This
major and unexpected decline in house prices means that many borrowers have
zero or negative equity in their homes, meaning their homes were worth less
than their mortgages. As of March 2008, an estimated 8.8 million borrowers —
10.8% of all homeowners — had negative equity in their homes, a number that is
believed to have risen to 12 million by November 2008. Borrowers in this
situation have an incentive to default on their mortgages, as a mortgage is
typically nonrecourse debt secured against the property. Economist Stan
Leibowitz argued in the Wall Street Journal that although only 12% of homes had
negative equity, they comprised 47% of foreclosures during the second half of
2008. He concluded that the extent of equity in the home was the key factor in
foreclosure, rather than the type of loan, credit worthiness of the borrower,
or ability to pay.
Increasing foreclosure
rates increases the inventory of houses offered for sale. The number of new
homes sold in 2007 was 26.4% less than in the preceding year. By January 2008,
the inventory of unsold new homes was 9.8 times the December 2007 sales volume,
the highest value of this ratio since 1981. Furthermore, nearly four million
existing homes were for sale, of which almost 2.9 million were vacant. This
overhang of unsold homes lowered house prices. As prices declined, more
homeowners were at risk of default or foreclosure. House prices are expected to
continue declining until this inventory of unsold homes (an instance of excess
supply) declines to normal levels.
Speculation
Speculative borrowing in
residential real estate has been cited as a contributing factor to the subprime
mortgage crisis. During 2006, 22% of homes purchased (1.65 million units) were
for investment purposes, with an additional 14% (1.07 million units) purchased
as vacation homes. During 2005, these figures were 28% and 12%, respectively.
In other words, a record level of nearly 40% of homes purchases were not
intended as primary residences. David Lereah, NAR's chief economist at the
time, stated that the 2006 decline in investment buying was expected:
"Speculators left the market in 2006, which caused investment sales to
fall much faster than the primary market."
Housing
prices nearly doubled between 2000 and 2006, a vastly different trend from the
historical appreciation at roughly the rate of inflation. While homes had not traditionally
been treated as investments subject to speculation, this behavior changed
during the housing boom. Media widely reported condominiums being purchased
while under construction, then being "flipped" (sold) for a profit
without the seller ever having lived in them. Some mortgage companies identified
risks inherent in this activity as early as 2005, after identifying investors
assuming highly leveraged positions in multiple properties.
Nicole Gelinas of the
Manhattan Institute described the negative consequences of not adjusting tax
and mortgage policies to the shifting treatment of a home from conservative
inflation hedge to speculative investment. Economist Robert Shiller argued that
speculative bubbles are fueled by "contagious optimism, seemingly
impervious to facts, that often takes hold when prices are rising. Bubbles are
primarily social phenomena; until we understand and address the psychology that
fuels them, they're going to keep forming." Keynesian economist Hyman
Minsky described how speculative borrowing contributed to rising debt and an
eventual collapse of asset values.
High-risk mortgage loans and lending/borrowing practices
In the years before the
crisis, the behavior of lenders changed dramatically. Lenders offered more and
more loans to higher-risk borrowers, including illegal immigrants. Subprime
mortgages amounted to $35 billion (5% of total originations) in 1994, 9% in
1996, $160 billion (13%) in 1999, and $600 billion (20%) in 2006.A study by the
Federal Reserve found that the average difference between subprime and prime
mortgage interest rates (the "subprime markup") declined
significantly between 2001 and 2007. The combination of declining risk premia
and credit standards is common to boom and bust credit cycles.
In
addition to considering higher-risk borrowers, lenders have offered
increasingly risky loan options and borrowing incentives. In 2005, the median
down payment for first-time homebuyers was 2%, with 43% of those buyers making
no down payment whatsoever. By comparison, China has down payment requirements
that exceed 20%, with higher amounts for non-primary residences.
Growth in
mortgage loan fraud based upon US Department of the Treasury Suspicious
Activity Report Analysis.
The mortgage qualification
guidelines began to change. At first, the stated income, verified assets (SIVA)
loans came out. Proof of income was no longer needed. Borrowers just needed to
"state" it and show that they had money in the bank. Then, the no
income, verified assets (NIVA) loans came out. The lender no longer required
proof of employment. Borrowers just needed to show proof of money in their bank
accounts. The qualification guidelines kept getting looser in order to produce
more mortgages and more securities. This led to the creation of NINA. NINA is
an abbreviation of No Income No Assets (sometimes referred to as Ninja loans).
Basically, NINA loans are official loan products and let you borrow money
without having to prove or even state any owned assets. All that was required
for a mortgage was a credit score.
Another example is the interest-only
adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), which allows the homeowner to pay just the
interest (not principal) during an initial period. Still another is a
"payment option" loan, in which the homeowner can pay a variable
amount, but any interest not paid is added to the principal. An estimated
one-third of ARMs originated between 2004 and 2006 had "teaser" rates
below 4%, which then increased significantly after some initial period, as much
as doubling the monthly payment.
The proportion of subprime
ARM loans made to people with credit scores high enough to qualify for
conventional mortgages with better terms increased from 41% in 2000 to 61% by
2006. However, there are many factors other than credit score that affect
lending. In addition, mortgage brokers in some cases received incentives from
lenders to offer subprime ARM's even to those with credit ratings that merited
a conforming (i.e., non-subprime) loan.
Mortgage
underwriting standards declined precipitously during the boom period. The use
of automated loan approvals allowed loans to be made without appropriate review
and documentation. In 2007, 40% of all subprime loans resulted from
automated underwriting. The chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association
claimed that mortgage brokers, while profiting from the home loan boom, did not
do enough to examine whether borrowers could repay. Mortgage fraud by lenders
and borrowers increased enormously. In 2004, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation warned of an "epidemic" in mortgage fraud, an important
credit risk of nonprime mortgage lending, which, they said, could lead to
"a problem that could have as much impact as the S&L crisis".
So why did lending
standards decline? In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents
argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in
worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by
U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. Further, this pool of money had
roughly doubled in size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe,
income generating investments had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall
Street answered this demand with financial innovation such as the
mortgage-backed security (MBS) and collateralized debt obligation (CDO), which
were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. In effect, Wall
Street connected this pool of money to the mortgage market in the U.S., with
enormous fees accruing to those throughout the mortgage supply chain, from the
mortgage broker selling the loans, to small banks that funded the brokers, to
the giant investment banks behind them. By approximately 2003, the supply of
mortgages originated at traditional lending standards had been exhausted.
However, continued strong demand for MBS and CDO began to drive down lending
standards, as long as mortgages could still be sold along the supply chain.
Eventually, this speculative bubble proved unsustainable. NPR described it this
way:
The problem was that even though housing prices were going
through the roof, people weren't making any more money. From 2000 to 2007, the
median household income stayed flat. And so the more prices rose, the more tenuous the whole
thing became. No matter how lax lending standards got, no matter how many
exotic mortgage products were created to shoehorn people into homes they
couldn't possibly afford, no matter what the mortgage machine tried, the people
just couldn't swing it. By late 2006, the average home cost nearly four times
what the average family made. Historically it was between two and three times.
And mortgage lenders noticed something that they'd almost never seen before. People would close on a house, sign all the mortgage
papers, and then default on their very first payment. No loss of a job, no
medical emergency, they were underwater before they even started. And although
no one could really hear it, that was probably the moment when one of the
biggest speculative bubbles in American history popped.
Borrowing under a securitization structure.
Further
information: Securitization and Mortgage-backed security
The traditional mortgage
model involved a bank originating a loan to the borrower/homeowner and
retaining the credit (default) risk. With the advent of securitization, the
traditional model has given way to the "originate to distribute"
model, in which banks essentially sell the mortgages and distribute credit risk
to investors through mortgage-backed securities. Securitization meant that
those issuing mortgages were no longer required to hold them to maturity. By
selling the mortgages to investors, the originating banks replenished their
funds, enabling them to issue more loans and generating transaction fees. This
created a moral hazard in which an increased focus on processing mortgage
transactions was incentivized but ensuring their credit quality was not.
Securitization accelerated
in the mid-1990s. The total amount of mortgage-backed securities issued almost
tripled between 1996 and 2007, to $7.3 trillion. The securitized share of
subprime mortgages (i.e., those passed to third-party investors via MBS)
increased from 54% in 2001, to 75% in 2006. American homeowners, consumers, and
corporations owed roughly $25 trillion during 2008. American banks retained
about $8 trillion of that total directly as traditional mortgage loans. Bondholders
and other traditional lenders provided another $7 trillion. The remaining $10
trillion came from the securitization markets. The securitization markets
started to close down in the spring of 2007 and nearly shutdown in the fall of
2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus became unavailable
as a source of funds. In February 2009, Ben Bernanke stated that securitization
markets remained effectively shut, with the exception of conforming mortgages,
which could be sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
A more direct connection
between securitization and the subprime crisis relates to a fundamental fault
in the way that underwriters, rating agencies and investors modeled the
correlation of risks among loans in securitization pools. Correlation
modeling—determining how the default risk of one loan in a pool is
statistically related to the default risk for other loans—was based on a
"Gaussian copula" technique developed by statistician David X. Li.
This technique, widely adopted as a means of evaluating the risk associated
with securitization transactions, used what turned out to be an overly
simplistic approach to correlation. Unfortunately, the flaws in this technique
did not become apparent to market participants until after many hundreds of
billions of dollars of ABS and CDOs backed by subprime loans had been rated and
sold. By the time investors stopped buying subprime-backed securities—which
halted the ability of mortgage originators to extend subprime loans—the effects
of the crisis were already beginning to emerge
Nobel laureate Dr. A.
Michael Spence wrote: "Financial innovation, intended to redistribute and
reduce risk, appears mainly to have hidden it from view. An important challenge
going forward is to better understand these dynamics as the analytical
underpinning of an early warning system with respect to financial
instability."
Inaccurate credit ratings
Credit rating agencies are
now under scrutiny for having given investment-grade ratings to MBSs based on
risky subprime mortgage loans. These high ratings enabled these MBS to be sold
to investors, thereby financing the housing boom. These ratings were believed
justified because of risk reducing practices, such as credit default insurance
and equity investors willing to bear the first losses. However, there are also
indications that some involved in rating subprime-related securities knew at
the time that the rating process was faulty.
Critics allege that the
rating agencies suffered from conflicts of interest, as they were paid by
investment banks and other firms that organize and sell structured securities
to investors. On 11 June 2008, the SEC proposed rules designed to mitigate
perceived conflicts of interest between rating agencies and issuers of
structured securities. On 3 December 2008, the SEC approved measures to
strengthen oversight of credit rating agencies, following a ten-month
investigation that found "significant weaknesses in ratings
practices," including conflicts of interest.
Between Q3 2007 and Q2
2008, rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on $1.9 trillion in
mortgage-backed securities. Financial institutions felt they had to lower the
value of their MBS and acquire additional capital so as to maintain capital
ratios. If this involved the sale of new shares of stock, the value of the
existing shares was reduced. Thus ratings downgrades lowered the stock prices
of many financial firms
Government policies
U.S.
Subprime lending expanded dramatically 2004-2006
Both government failed
regulation and deregulation contributed to the crisis. In testimony before
Congress both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Alan Greenspan
conceded failure in allowing the self-regulation of investment banks.
Increasing home ownership
has been the goal of several presidents including Roosevelt, Reagan, Clinton
and G.W.Bush. In 1982, Congress passed the Alternative Mortgage Transactions
Parity Act (AMTPA), which allowed non-federally chartered housing creditors to
write adjustable-rate mortgages. Among the new mortgage loan types created and
gaining in popularity in the early 1980s were adjustable-rate, option
adjustable-rate, balloon-payment and interest-only mortgages. These new loan
types are credited with replacing the long-standing practice of banks making
conventional fixed-rate, amortizing mortgages. Among the criticisms of banking
industry deregulation that contributed to the savings and loan crisis was that
Congress failed to enact regulations that would have prevented exploitations by
these loan types. Subsequent widespread abuses of predatory lending occurred
with the use of adjustable-rate mortgages. Approximately 80% of subprime
mortgages are adjustable-rate mortgages.
In 1995, the GSEs like
Fannie Mae began receiving government tax incentives for purchasing mortgage
backed securities, which included loans to low income borrowers. Thus began the
involvement of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the subprime market. In
1996, HUD set a goal for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that at least 42% of the
mortgages they purchase be issued to borrowers whose household income was below
the median in their area. This target was increased to 50% in 2000 and 52% in
2005. From 2002 to 2006, as the U.S. subprime market grew 292% over previous
years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac combined purchases of subprime securities
rose from $38 billion to around $175 billion per year before dropping to $90
billion per year, which included $350 billion of Alt-A securities. Fannie Mae
had stopped buying Alt-A products in the early 1990s because of the high risk
of default. By 2008, the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned, either directly or
through mortgage pools they sponsored, $5.1 trillion in residential mortgages,
about half the total U.S. mortgage market. The GSE have always been highly
leveraged, their net worth as of 30 June 2008 being a mere US$114 billion. When
concerns arose in September 2008 regarding the ability of the GSE to make good
on their guarantees, the Federal government was forced to place the companies
into a conservatorship, effectively nationalizing them at the taxpayers'
expense.
The Glass-Steagall Act was
enacted after the Great Depression. It separated commercial banks and
investment banks, in part to avoid potential conflicts of interest between the
lending activities of the former and rating activities of the latter. Economist
Joseph Stiglitz criticized the repeal of the Act. He called its repeal the
"culmination of a $300 million lobbying effort by the banking and
financial services industries...spearheaded in Congress by Senator Phil
Gramm." He believes it contributed to this crisis because the risk-taking
culture of investment banking dominated the more conservative commercial
banking culture, leading to increased levels of risk-taking and leverage during
the boom period. The Federal government bailout of thrifts during the savings
and loan crisis of the late 1980s may have encouraged other lenders to make
risky loans, and thus given rise to moral hazard.
Conservatives and
Libertarians have also debated the possible effects of the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA), with detractors claiming that the Act encouraged
lending to uncreditworthy borrowers, and defenders claiming a thirty-year
history of lending without increased risk. Detractors also claim that
amendments to the CRA in the mid-1990s, raised the amount of mortgages issued
to otherwise unqualified low-income borrowers, and allowed the securitization
of CRA-regulated mortgages, even though a fair number of them were subprime.
Both Federal Reserve
Governor Randall Kroszner and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair have stated their
belief that the CRA was not to blame for the crisis.
Economist Paul Krugman
argued in January 2010 that the simultaneous growth of the residential and
commercial real estate pricing bubbles undermines the case made by those who
argue that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, CRA or predatory lending were primary
causes of the crisis. In other words, bubbles in both markets developed even
though only the residential market was affected by these potential causes
Policies of central banks
Federal Funds Rate and
Various Mortgage Rates
Central banks manage
monetary policy and may target the rate of inflation. They have some authority
over commercial banks and possibly other financial institutions. They are less
concerned with avoiding asset price bubbles, such as the housing bubble and
dot-com bubble. Central banks have generally chosen to react after such bubbles
burst so as to minimize collateral damage to the economy, rather than trying to
prevent or stop the bubble itself. This is because identifying an asset bubble
and determining the proper monetary policy to deflate it are matters of debate
among economists.
Some market observers have
been concerned that Federal Reserve actions could give rise to moral hazard. A
Government Accountability Office critic said that the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York's rescue of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 would encourage large
financial institutions to believe that the Federal Reserve would intervene on
their behalf if risky loans went sour because they were “too big to fail.”
A contributing factor to
the rise in house prices was the Federal Reserve's lowering of interest rates
early in the decade. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal
funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%. This was done to soften the effects of the
collapse of the dot-com bubble and of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and
to combat the perceived risk of deflation. The Fed believed that interest rates
could be lowered safely primarily because the rate of inflation was low; it
disregarded other important factors. Richard W. Fisher, President and CEO of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, said that the Fed's interest rate policy
during the early 2000s was misguided, because measured inflation in those years
was below true inflation, which led to a monetary policy that contributed to
the housing bubble. According to Ben Bernanke, now chairman of the Federal
Reserve, it was capital or savings pushing into the United States, due to a
world wide "saving glut", which kept long term interest rates low
independently of Central Bank action.
The Fed then raised the Fed
funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006. This contributed to
an increase in 1-year and 5-year ARM rates, making ARM interest rate resets
more expensive for homeowners. This may have also contributed to the deflating
of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest
rates and it became riskier to speculate in housing.
Financial institution debt levels and incentives
Leverage
Ratios of Investment Banks Increased Significantly 2003–2007
Many financial
institutions, investment banks in particular, issued large amounts of debt
during 2004–2007, and invested the proceeds in mortgage-backed securities (MBS),
essentially betting that house prices would continue to rise, and that
households would continue to make their mortgage payments. Borrowing at a lower
interest rate and investing the proceeds at a higher interest rate is a form of
financial leverage. This is analogous to an individual taking out a second
mortgage on his residence to invest in the stock market. This strategy proved
profitable during the housing boom, but resulted in large losses when house
prices began to decline and mortgages began to default. Beginning in 2007,
financial institutions and individual investors holding MBS also suffered
significant losses from mortgage payment defaults and the resulting decline in
the value of MBS.
A 2004 U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) decision related to the net capital rule allowed USA
investment banks to issue substantially more debt, which was then used to
purchase MBS. Over 2004-07, the top five US investment banks each significantly
increased their financial leverage (see diagram), which increased their
vulnerability to the declining value of MBSs. These five institutions reported
over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP
for 2007. Further, the percentage of subprime mortgages originated to total originations
increased from below 10% in 2001-2003 to between 18-20% from 2004–2006, due
in-part to financing from investment banks.
During 2008, three of the
largest U.S. investment banks either went bankrupt (Lehman Brothers) or were
sold at fire sale prices to other banks (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch). These
failures augmented the instability in the global financial system. The
remaining two investment banks, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, opted to
become commercial banks, thereby subjecting themselves to more stringent
regulation.
In the years leading up to
the crisis, the top four U.S. depository banks moved an estimated $5.2 trillion
in assets and liabilities off-balance sheet into special purpose vehicles or
other entities in the shadow banking system. This enabled them to essentially
bypass existing regulations regarding minimum capital ratios, thereby
increasing leverage and profits during the boom but increasing losses during
the crisis. New accounting guidance will require them to put some of these
assets back onto their books during 2009, which will significantly reduce their
capital ratios. One news agency estimated this amount to be between $500
billion and $1 trillion. This effect was considered as part of the stress tests
performed by the government during 2009.
Martin Wolf wrote in June
2009: "...an enormous part of what banks did in the early part of this
decade – the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the derivatives and the 'shadow
banking system' itself – was to find a way round regulation.
The New York State
Comptroller's Office has said that in 2006, Wall Street executives took home
bonuses totaling $23.9 billion. "Wall Street traders were thinking of the
bonus at the end of the year, not the long-term health of their firm. The whole
system—from mortgage brokers to Wall Street risk managers—seemed tilted toward
taking short-term risks while ignoring long-term obligations. The most damning
evidence is that most of the people at the top of the banks didn't really
understand how those [investments] worked."
Investment banker incentive
compensation was focused on fees generated from assembling financial products,
rather than the performance of those products and profits generated over time.
Their bonuses were heavily skewed towards cash rather than stock and not
subject to "claw-back" (recovery of the bonus from the employee by
the firm) in the event the MBS or CDO created did not perform. In addition, the
increased risk (in the form of financial leverage) taken by the major investment
banks was not adequately factored into the compensation of senior executives.
Credit default swaps
Credit default swaps (CDS)
are financial instruments used as a hedge and protection for debt holders, in
particular MBS investors, from the risk of default. As the net worth of banks
and other financial institutions deteriorated because of losses related to
subprime mortgages, the likelihood increased that those providing the insurance
would have to pay their counterparties. This created uncertainty across the system,
as investors wondered which companies would be required to pay to cover
mortgage defaults.
Like all swaps and other
financial derivatives, CDS may either be used to hedge risks (specifically, to
insure creditors against default) or to profit from speculation. The volume of
CDS outstanding increased 100-fold from 1998 to 2008, with estimates of the
debt covered by CDS contracts, as of November 2008, ranging from US$33 to $47
trillion. CDS are lightly regulated. As of 2008, there was no central clearinghouse
to honor CDS in the event a party to a CDS proved unable to perform his
obligations under the CDS contract. Required disclosure of CDS-related
obligations has been criticized as inadequate. Insurance companies such as
American International Group (AIG), MBIA, and Ambac faced ratings downgrades
because widespread mortgage defaults increased their potential exposure to CDS
losses. These firms had to obtain additional funds (capital) to offset this
exposure. AIG's having CDSs insuring $440 billion of MBS resulted in its
seeking and obtaining a Federal government bailout.
Like all swaps and other
pure wagers, what one party loses under a CDS, the other party gains; CDSs
merely reallocate existing wealth [that is, provided that the paying party can
perform]. Hence the question is which side of the CDS will have to pay and will
it be able to do so. When investment bank Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in
September 2008, there was much uncertainty as to which financial firms would be
required to honor the CDS contracts on its $600 billion of bonds outstanding.
Merrill Lynch's large losses in 2008 were attributed in part to the drop in
value of its unhedged portfolio of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) after
AIG ceased offering CDS on Merrill's CDOs. The loss of confidence of trading
partners in Merrill Lynch's solvency and its ability to refinance its
short-term debt led to its acquisition by the Bank of America.
Economist Joseph Stiglitz
summarized how credit default swaps contributed to the systemic meltdown:
"With this complicated intertwining of bets of great magnitude, no one
could be sure of the financial position of anyone else-or even of one's own
position. Not surprisingly, the credit markets froze.
US Balance of Payments
U.S.
Current Account or Trade Deficit
In 2005, Ben Bernanke
addressed the implications of the USA's high and rising current account
deficit, resulting from USA investment exceeding its savings, or imports
exceeding exports. Between 1996 and 2004, the USA current account deficit
increased by $650 billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. The US attracted a great
deal of foreign investment, mainly from the emerging economies in Asia and
oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country
(such as the USA) running a current account deficit also have a capital account
(investment) surplus of the same amount. Foreign investors had these funds to
lend, either because they had very high personal savings rates (as high as 40%
in China), or because of high oil prices. Bernanke referred to this as a
"saving glut" that may have pushed capital into the USA, a view
differing from that of some other economists, who view such capital as having
been pulled into
the USA by its high consumption levels. In other words, a nation cannot consume
more than its income unless it sells assets to foreigners, or foreigners are
willing to lend to it. Alternatively, if a nation wishes to increase domestic
investment in plant and equipment, it will also increase it's level of imports
to maintain balance if it has a floating exchange rate.
Regardless of the push or
pull view, a "flood" of funds (capital or liquidity) reached the USA
financial markets. Foreign governments supplied funds by purchasing USA
Treasury bonds and thus avoided much of the direct impact of the crisis. USA
households, on the other hand, used funds borrowed from foreigners to finance
consumption or to bid up the prices of housing and financial
assets. Financial institutions invested
foreign funds in mortgage-backed securities. USA housing and financial assets
dramatically declined in value after the housing bubble burst.
Boom and collapse of the shadow banking system
In a June
2008 speech, President of the NY Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner, who
later became Secretary of the Treasury, placed significant blame for the
freezing of credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the
"parallel" banking system, also called the shadow banking system.
These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial
system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these
entities were vulnerable because they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to
purchase long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in
credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their
long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the significance of these
entities: "In early 2007, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, in
structured investment vehicles, in auction-rate preferred securities, tender
option bonds and variable rate demand notes, had a combined asset size of
roughly $2.2 trillion. Assets financed overnight in triparty repo grew to $2.5
trillion. Assets held in hedge funds grew to roughly $1.8 trillion. The
combined balance sheets of the then five major investment banks totaled $4
trillion. In comparison, the total assets of the top five bank holding
companies in the United States at that point were just over $6 trillion, and
total assets of the entire banking system were about $10 trillion." He
stated that the "combined effect of these factors was a financial system
vulnerable to self-reinforcing asset price and credit cycles.
Impacts
from the Crisis on Key Wealth Measures
Between June 2007 and
November 2008, Americans lost more than a quarter of their net worth. By early
November 2008, a broad U.S. stock index, the S&P 500, was down 45 percent
from its 2007 high. Housing prices had dropped 20% from their 2006 peak, with
futures markets signaling a 30-35% potential drop. Total home equity in the
United States, which was valued at $13 trillion at its peak in 2006, had
dropped to $8.8 trillion by mid-2008 and was still falling in late 2008. Total
retirement assets, Americans' second-largest household asset, dropped by 22 percent,
from $10.3 trillion in 2006 to $8 trillion in mid-2008. During the same period,
savings and investment assets (apart from retirement savings) lost $1.2
trillion and pension assets lost $1.3 trillion. Taken together, these losses
total a staggering $8.3 trillion. Members of USA minority groups received a
disproportionate number of subprime mortgages, and so have experienced a
disproportionate level of the resulting foreclosures.
Financial market impacts, 2007
The crisis began to affect
the financial sector in February 2007, when HSBC, the world's largest (2008)
bank, wrote down its holdings of subprime-related MBS by $10.5 billion, the
first major subprime related loss to be reported. During 2007, at least 100
mortgage companies either shut down, suspended operations or were sold. Top
management has not escaped unscathed, as the CEOs of Merrill Lynch and
Citigroup resigned within a week of each other in late 2007. As the crisis
deepened, more and more financial firms either merged, or announced that they
were negotiating seeking merger partners.
During 2007, the crisis
caused panic in financial markets and encouraged investors to take their money
out of risky mortgage bonds and shaky equities and put it into commodities as
"stores of value" Financial speculation in commodity futures
following the collapse of the financial derivatives markets has contributed to
the world food price crisis and oil price increases due to a "commodities
super-cycle." Financial speculators seeking quick returns have removed trillions
of dollars from equities and mortgage bonds, some of which has been invested
into food and raw materials.
Mortgage defaults and
provisions for future defaults caused profits at the 8533 USA depository
institutions insured by the FDIC to decline from $35.2 billion in 2006 Q4
billion to $646 million in the same quarter a year later, a decline of 98%.
2007 Q4 saw the worst bank and thrift quarterly performance since 1990. In all
of 2007, insured depository institutions earned approximately $100 billion,
down 31% from a record profit of $145 billion in 2006. Profits declined from
$35.6 billion in 2007 Q1 to $19.3 billion in 2008 Q1, a decline of 46%.
Financial market impacts, 2008
As of August 2008,
financial firms around the globe have written down their holdings of subprime
related securities by US$501 billion. The IMF estimates that financial
institutions around the globe will eventually have to write off $1.5 trillion
of their holdings of subprime MBSs. About $750 billion in such losses had been
recognized as of November 2008. These losses have wiped out much of the capital
of the world banking system. Banks headquartered in nations that have signed
the Basel Accords must have so many cents of capital for every dollar of credit
extended to consumers and businesses. Thus the massive reduction in bank
capital just described has reduced the credit available to businesses and
households.
When Lehman Brothers and
other important financial institutions failed in September 2008, the crisis hit
a key point. During a two-day period in September 2008, $150 billion were
withdrawn from USA money funds. The average two-day outflow had been $5
billion. In effect, the money market was subject to a bank run. The money
market had been a key source of credit for banks (CDs) and nonfinancial firms
(commercial paper). The TED spread (see graph above), a measure of the risk of
interbank lending, quadrupled shortly after the Lehman failure. This credit
freeze brought the global financial system to the brink of collapse. The
response of the USA Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other
central banks was immediate and dramatic. During the last quarter of 2008,
these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and troubled
private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the
credit market, and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. The
governments of European nations and the USA also raised the capital of their
national banking systems by $1.5 trillion, by purchasing newly issued preferred
stock in their major banks.
However, some economists
state that Third-World economies, such as the Brazilian and Chinese ones, will
not suffer as much as those from more developed countries.
The International Monetary
Fund estimated that large U.S. and European banks lost more than $1 trillion on
toxic assets and from bad loans from January 2007 to September 2009. These
losses are expected to top $2.8 trillion from 2007-10. U.S. banks losses were
forecast to hit $1 trillion and European bank losses will reach $1.6 trillion.
The IMF estimated that U.S. banks were about 60 percent through their losses,
but British and eurozone banks only 40 percent.
Responses
: Subprime
mortgage crisis solutions debate
Various actions have been taken
since the crisis became apparent in August 2007. In September 2008, major
instability in world financial markets increased awareness and attention to the
crisis. Various agencies and regulators, as well as political officials, began
to take additional, more comprehensive steps to handle the crisis.
To date, various government
agencies have committed or spent trillions of dollars in loans, asset
purchases, guarantees, and direct spending. For a summary of U.S. government
financial commitments and investments related to the crisis, see CNN - Bailout
Scorecard.
Federal Reserve and central banks
The central bank of the
USA, the Federal Reserve, in partnership with central banks around the world,
has taken several steps to address the crisis. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke stated in early 2008: "Broadly, the Federal Reserve's response
has followed two tracks: efforts to support market liquidity and functioning
and the pursuit of our macroeconomic objectives through monetary policy."
The Fed has:
- Lowered the target for the
Federal funds rate from 5.25% to 2%, and the discount rate from 5.75% to
2.25%. This took place in six steps occurring between 18 September 2007
and 30 April 2008 In December 2008, the Fed further lowered the federal
funds rate target to a range of 0-0.25% (25 basis points)
- Undertaken, along with
other central banks, open market operations to ensure member banks remain
liquid. These are effectively short-term loans to member banks
collateralized by government securities. Central banks have also lowered
the interest rates (called the discount rate in the USA) they charge
member banks for short-term loans;
- Created a variety of
lending facilities to enable the Fed to lend directly to banks and
non-bank institutions, against specific types of collateral of varying
credit quality. These include the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).
- In November 2008, the Fed
announced a $600 billion program to purchase the MBS of the GSE, to help
lower mortgage rates.[
- In March 2009, the FOMC
decided to increase the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet
further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency (GSE)
mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these
securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its
purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up
to $200 billion. Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit
markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of
longer-term Treasury securities during 2009.
According to Ben Bernanke,
expansion of the Fed balance sheet means the Fed is electronically creating
money, necessary "...because our economy is very weak and inflation is
very low. When the economy begins to recover, that will be the time that we
need to unwind those programs, raise interest rates, reduce the money supply,
and make sure that we have a recovery that does not involve inflation.
Economic stimulus
On 13 February 2008,
President Bush signed into law a $168 billion economic stimulus package, mainly
taking the form of income tax rebate checks mailed directly to taxpayers.
Checks were mailed starting the week of 28 April 2008. However, this rebate
coincided with an unexpected jump in gasoline and food prices. This coincidence
led some to wonder whether the stimulus package would have the intended effect,
or whether consumers would simply spend their rebates to cover higher food and
fuel prices.
On 17 February 2009, U.S.
President Barack Obama signed the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, a $787 billion stimulus
package with a broad spectrum of spending and tax cuts. Over $75 billion of
which was specifically allocated to programs that help struggling homeowners.
This program is referred to as the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan.
Bank solvency and capital replenishment
Losses on mortgage-backed
securities and other assets purchased with borrowed money have dramatically
reduced the capital base of financial institutions, rendering many either
insolvent or less capable of lending. Governments have provided funds to banks.
Some banks have taken significant steps to acquire additional capital from
private sources.
The U.S.
government passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA or
TARP) during October 2008. This law included $700 billion in funding for the
"Troubled Assets Relief Program" (TARP), which was used to lend funds
to banks in exchange for dividend-paying preferred stock.
Another method of
recapitalizing banks is for government and private investors to provide cash in
exchange for mortgage-related assets (i.e., "toxic" or
"legacy" assets), improving the quality of bank capital while
reducing uncertainty regarding the financial position of banks. U.S. Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner announced a plan during March 2009 to purchase
"legacy" or "toxic" assets from banks. The Public-Private
Partnership Investment Program involves government loans and guarantees to
encourage private investors to provide funds to purchase toxic assets from
banks.
For a summary of U.S.
government financial commitments and investments related to the crisis, see CNN
- Bailout Scorecard.
For a summary of TARP
funds provided to U.S. banks as of December 2008, see Reuters-TARP Funds.
Bailouts and failures of financial firms
Several major financial
institutions either failed, were bailed-out by governments, or merged
(voluntarily or otherwise) during the crisis. While the specific circumstances
varied, in general the decline in the value of mortgage-backed securities held
by these companies resulted in either their insolvency, the equivalent of bank
runs as investors pulled funds from them, or inability to secure new funding in
the credit markets. These firms had typically borrowed and invested large sums
of money relative to their cash or equity capital, meaning they were highly
leveraged and vulnerable to unanticipated credit market disruptions.
The five largest U.S.
investment banks, with combined liabilities or debts of $4 trillion, either
went bankrupt (Lehman Brothers), were taken over by other companies (Bear
Stearns and Merrill Lynch), or were bailed-out by the U.S. government (Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley) during 2008. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSE)
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac either directly owed or guaranteed nearly $5
trillion in mortgage obligations, with a similarly weak capital base, when they
were placed into receivership in September 2008. For scale, this $9 trillion in
obligations concentrated in seven highly leveraged institutions can be compared
to the $14 trillion size of the U.S. economy
(GDP) or to the total national debt of $10 trillion in September 2008.
Major depository banks
around the world had also used financial innovations such as structured investment
vehicles to circumvent capital ratio regulations. Notable global failures
included Northern Rock, which was nationalized at an estimated cost of £87
billion ($150 billion). In the U.S., Washington Mutual (WaMu) was seized in
September 2008 by the USA Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Dozens of U.S.
banks received funds as part of the TARP or $700 billion bailout.
As a result of the
financial crisis in 2008, twenty-five U.S. banks became insolvent and were
taken over by the FDIC. As of August 14, 2009, an additional 77 banks became
insolvent. This seven-month tally surpasses the 50 banks that were seized in
all of 1993, but is still much smaller than the number of failed banking
institutions in 1992, 1991, and 1990. The United States has lost over 6 million
jobs since the recession began in December 2007.
The FDIC deposit insurance
fund, supported by fees on insured banks, fell to $13 billion in the first
quarter of 2009. That is the lowest total since September 1993
Homeowner assistance
Both lenders and borrowers
may benefit from avoiding foreclosure, which is a costly and lengthy process.
Some lenders have offered troubled borrowers more favorable mortgage terms
(i.e., refinancing, loan modification or loss mitigation). Borrowers have also
been encouraged to contact their lenders to discuss alternatives.
The Economist described the
issue this way: "No part of the financial crisis has received so much
attention, with so little to show for it, as the tidal wave of home
foreclosures sweeping over America. Government programs have been ineffectual,
and private efforts not much better." Up to 9 million homes may enter
foreclosure over the 2009-2011 period, versus one million in a typical year. At
roughly U.S. $50,000 per foreclosure according to a 2006 study by the Chicago
Federal Reserve Bank, 9 million foreclosures represents $450 billion in losses.
A variety of voluntary
private and government-administered or supported programs were implemented
during 2007-2009 to assist homeowners with case-by-case mortgage assistance, to
mitigate the foreclosure crisis engulfing the U.S. One example is the Hope Now
Alliance, an ongoing collaborative effort between the US Government and private
industry to help certain subprime borrowers. In February 2008, the Alliance
reported that during the second half of 2007, it had helped 545,000 subprime
borrowers with shaky credit, or 7.7% of 7.1 million subprime loans outstanding
as of September 2007. A spokesperson for the Alliance acknowledged that much
more must be done.
During
late 2008, major banks and both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac established
moratoriums (delays) on foreclosures, to give homeowners time to work towards
refinancing.
Critics have argued that
the case-by-case loan modification method is ineffective, with too few
homeowners assisted relative to the number of foreclosures and with nearly 40%
of those assisted homeowners again becoming delinquent within 8 months In
December 2008, the U.S. FDIC reported that more than half of mortgages modified
during the first half of 2008 were delinquent again, in many cases because
payments were not reduced or mortgage debt was not forgiven. This is further
evidence that case-by-case loan modification is not effective as a policy tool.
In February 2009,
economists Nouriel Roubini and Mark Zandi recommended an "across the
board" (systemic) reduction of mortgage principal balances by as much as
20-30%. Lowering the mortgage balance would help lower monthly payments and
also address an estimated 20 million homeowners that may have a financial
incentive to enter voluntary foreclosure because they are
"underwater" (i.e., the mortgage balance is larger than the home
value).
A study by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston indicated that banks were reluctant to modify loans.
Only 3% of seriously delinquent homeowners had their mortgage payments reduced
during 2008. In addition, investors who hold MBS and have a say in mortgage
modifications have not been a significant impediment; the study found no
difference in the rate of assistance whether the loans were controlled by the
bank or by investors. Commenting on the study, economists Dean Baker and Paul
Willen both advocated providing funds directly to homeowners instead of banks.
The L.A. Times reported the results of a study
that found homeowners with high credit scores at the time of entering the
mortgage are 50% more likely to "strategically default" -- abruptly
and intentionally pull the plug and abandon the mortgage—compared with
lower-scoring borrowers. Such strategic defaults were heavily concentrated in
markets with the highest price declines. An estimated 588,000 strategic
defaults occurred nationwide during 2008, more than double the total in 2007.
They represented 18% of all serious delinquencies that extended for more than 60
days in the fourth quarter of 2008.
Homeowners Affordability and Stability Plan
Main
article: Homeowners
Affordability and Stability Plan
On 18 February 2009, U.S.
President Barack Obama announced a $73 billion program to help up to nine
million homeowners avoid foreclosure, which was supplemented by $200 billion in
additional funding for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase and more easily
refinance mortgages. The plan is funded mostly from the EESA's $700 billion
financial bailout fund. It uses cost sharing and incentives to encourage
lenders to reduce homeowner's monthly payments to 31 percent of their monthly
income. Under the program, a lender would be responsible for reducing monthly
payments to no more than 38 percent of a borrower’s income, with government
sharing the cost to further cut the rate to 31 percent. The plan also involves
forgiving a portion of the borrower’s mortgage balance. Companies that service
mortgages will get incentives to modify loans and to help the homeowner stay
current.
Regulatory
proposals and long-term solutions
Further
information: Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate and Regulatory
responses to the subprime crisis
President Barack Obama and
key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009. The
proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank financial cushions
or capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and
derivatives, and enhanced authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down
systemically important institutions, among others.